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Khul‘ in Action: How Do Local Muslim Communities in
Germany Dissolve an Islamic Religious-Only Marriage?
MAHMOUD JARABA
Abstract
Relying upon extensive ethnographic field-collected data as well as 51 privately per-
formed documents of khul‘ (divorce initiated by a woman), this article addresses two
questions. Firstly, how have practices of khul‘ among local Muslim communities
been influenced by Germany’s secular state framework? Secondly, how do local
religious actors develop extrajudicial religious forms of mediation and arbitration,
often taking place in a mosque or a private place, in order to fulfil certain aspects
of sharı¯ʿah? The paper argues that the absence of a recognised Islamic judicial auth-
ority or formally recognised Islamic mediation and arbitration service in Germany
has led Muslim communities to come up with “local experts”, who purport to
implement elements of sharı¯ʿah through informal mediation and arbitration. This
leads to new religious actions and norms which might, in the future, lead to normal-
ised new practices in countries such as Germany where Muslims are a minority.
Keywords: khul‘; t.ala¯q; h. ad. a¯na; imams; sharı¯ʿah; mediation; arbitration; Islam in
Germany; European Muslims; new anthropology of Islam
Introduction
For members of Muslim communities in Germany, the process of conducting an Islamic
religious-only marriage is an effortless, uncomplicated and swift process. However, when
this type of marriage breaks down, or when a wife wants to end the relationship against the
husband’s wishes, she might then face legal, social, economic, and emotional conse-
quences. Relying upon extensive ethnographic field-collected data as well as 51 privately
executed documents of khul‘1—a form of divorce initiated by a woman in which she pays
fidya (compensation) to her husband in return for his agreement to terminate the mar-
riage2—the purpose of this article is to examine two central questions.3 Firstly, how
have the religious practices among local Muslim communities regarding khul‘ been influ-
enced by the German secular state context? Secondly, how do local religious actors
develop various extrajudicial religious forms of mediation and arbitration, which often
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take place in a mosque or a private place, in order to practice and apply certain aspects of
the sharı¯ʿah to khul‘?
In recent years, a growing body conducting socio-legal work on the practice of Islamic
law has emerged.4 Some scholars are now drawing a theoretical and practical distinction
between two different attributes of sharı¯ʿah, the first of which relates to the moral, ethical
and spiritual aspects of Muslim religious practices, placed in the category of “non-law-
based”, i.e. not juridically enforceable and existing mostly outside the scope of legislation
in Western countries. The second attribute, on the other hand, is strictly legal or “law-
based”, which relates to family law or inheritance and is subject to juridical enforcement
in a strict legal sense.5
The Sharı¯ʿah Councils in Britain and Europe
In Europe recently, some scholars have conducted in-depth studies on different
applications of sharı¯ʿah “law” outside the court systems, through either mediation or reli-
gious arbitration. Most of these studies have taken a close look at the British context by
analysing the different roles played by sharı¯ʿah councils in offering sharı¯ʿah-compliant sol-
utions to family and personal disputes.6 Since 1982, sharı¯ʿah councils have been operating
unofficially in Britain to deal with civil disputes. These councils have no legal authority
and are incapable of imposing sanctions. However, most of the British sharı¯ʿah councils
are well-organised, institutionalised and offer professional advice. As Bowen observes,
“they provide downloadable forms on their websites, charge set fees for service, and
meet on scheduled days of the month”.7 Whether in London, Birmingham, Manchester
or Bradford, there are sharı¯ʿah councils providing services by appointment or online,
including marriage, divorce, khul‘ besides many other mediation and arbitration services.8
In contrast to the British sharı¯ʿah councils, extrajudicial mediation and arbitration in
other European countries are, to a great extent, informal and unregulated. As Bowen
puts it, “alone among Western countries, Britain has a range of institutions that
mediate or arbitrate conﬂicts among Muslims”.9 In such contexts, what will happen if
a wife or a husband seeks help and support within their community regarding a private
family dispute? To answer such a question, a number of studies and research projects
have been—or are currently—tackling this complex task, by analysing the unofficial
and informal roles played by religious actors in settling family disputes, or in implement-
ing certain family-related aspects of sharı¯ʿah in different European countries.10
In Germany, scientific work conducted on the practice of Muslim religious extra-judi-
cial mediation and arbitration, as Mathias Rohe recently notes, “has been close to a blind
spot so far”.11 The debate on extrajudicial mediation has been more public and political
than academic and legal. For several years, the German media and some politicians have
commented on extrajudicial practices, describing them as a system of “paralleljustiz” (par-
allel justice), i.e. a system characterised by its own regulatory mechanisms, operating
mostly outside the framework of the state law, and potentially violating, undermining
or thwarting German legal standards. In many cases, media debate has created the
impression that such a system is based on sharı¯ʿah, which, in turn, undermines the
state’s monopoly on the use of force. In this context, sharı¯ʿah is perceived as a threat to
Germany’s constitution, laws, and culture. Recently, the debate on “paralleljustiz” has
been officially introduced into the political agendas at the federal levels and government.
As of March 2018, the coalition treaty of Christian Democrats (CDU), the Christian
Social Union (CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) declared that “illegale
paralleljustiz” (illegal parallel justice) would not be tolerated and that the government
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would, instead, support the development of “Law—Made in Germany”. The Alternative
for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), a right-wing political party, brought
the debate to the German Parliament (the Bundestag) by requesting the Federal
Government to clarify the relationship between “paralleljustiz” and the application of
Islamic sharı¯ʿah.12 At the federal levels, different initiatives and projects have been
created in order to study, exchange information, and develop solutions to the
phenomenon of “paralleljustiz”.
As opposed to this public debate, few projects, based on empirical research and com-
parative data gained in fieldwork, are currently attempting to tackle and understand the
phenomenon of “paralleljustiz” in its socio-legal complexity and cultural contexts.13
According to Mathias Rohe, the phenomenon of “paralleljustiz” differs fundamentally
from the admissible or (even) requested Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in
general. While the latter is based on voluntary participation, neutrality and professionalism
of the mediators/arbitrators, as well as respect for the applicable law, “paralleljustiz” thrives
on the intimidation of the weak party and the lack of state protection. “Paralleljustiz” is
further characterised by its own regulatory mechanisms compared to state- centred laws.14
This study seeks to fill some lacuna of conflict regulations amongMuslim communities
in Germany. It investigates howMuslim actors use different forms of informal mediation
and arbitration to decide on issues related to khul‘,when amarriage reaches a point where
the wife is absolutely certain about terminating her marriage but the husband refuses to
divorce her. Based on intensive ethnographic fieldwork, this paper suggests that the
absence of a recognised Islamic judicial authority in Germany, or a formally recognised
Islamic mediation and arbitration service, has led Muslim communities to come up with
“local experts” capable of implementing various elements of sharı¯ʿah, through informal
mediation and arbitration. Consequently, this might implement new religious actions
and norms as well as normalise new practices in settings, such as Germany, where
Muslims are considered a minority.
After having presented, firstly, the methodology implemented to gather the ethno-
graphic data, this paper discusses the nika¯h. (Islamic marriage contract), and how such
marriages may entail significant consequences since the parties involved have no legal
standing or lawful claim to the various legal rights of a spouse. Furthermore, in case a mar-
riage breaks down and the husband declines the request for a divorce, the wife may find
herself in an unresolved situation, not backed up or protected by law. The research
explains how, in order to assist these women, different types of religious mediation and
arbitration are practised by religious actors, as well as considering the limitation of such
practices and their shortfalls. The next part of the paper focuses on the analysis of fifty-
one khul‘-related documents, which are divided into two main sections. The first
section deals with cases where khul‘ is practised by mutual consent between husband
and wife and how, with the assistance of religious actors, the two parties can solve dis-
agreements and conflicts related to fidya and the custody of children. The second
section discusses cases that were solved by means of “judicial khul‘”, and how religious
actors invoke particular religious opinions ( fatwa¯) through which they can acquire for
themselves some of the powers normally reserved for judges in Muslim countrie. They
use these to end a nika¯h. through khul‘, even if a husband withholds consent.
Bowen’s “New Anthropology of Islam”
Following John Bowen’s work on “new anthropology of Islam”, this article aims to con-
tribute to this debate through examining the constitutive practices of khul‘ within the
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complexity and diversity of Arab Muslim communities in Germany. This approach, as
suggested by Bowen, has increasingly focused on religious texts and ideas exclusively,
as they are both understood and shaped at specific times and places.15 Studying Islam
and Muslims, therefore, begins with individuals who grapple with “text” to shape
people’s lives and give them a new meaning. In other words, I study both practices in
which people engage as well as new norms and meanings that they have been trying to
evolve and socially construct. To quote Bowen:
This way of looking at Islam thus starts from people drawing on textual tra-
ditions to inform social practices, and it allows us to engage in two complemen-
tary analytical strategies. The first is “focusing inward,” by deepening our
understanding of intentions, understandings, and emotions surrounding
specific practices, usually with a great deal of attention to individual testimonies
and histories.16
The analysis in this article has been based on the ethnographic fieldwork undertaken in
different phases between 2013 and 2017 in the German states of Berlin, Bavaria,
North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse. Over 130 qualitative interviews have been con-
ducted with male religious actors who, in one way or another, have dealt with issues relat-
ing to the practice of nika¯h. , t.ala¯q (Islamic divorce) and khul‘. All of those actors are
serving mainly in Sunni Muslim communities, and most of them are of Arab origin.
The duration of the interviews varied considerably; some lasted for only 30 minutes,
whereas others went on for almost three and a half hours. Using a semi-structured inter-
view method, the interviews were conducted on a face-to-face basis and many of the par-
ticipants were interviewed several times.17
Most importantly, the opportunity to examine thousands of documents containing
valuable information about the terms and conditions pertaining to nika¯h. , t.ala¯q and
khul‘ was rather slim during the fieldwork conducted in Berlin in 2015. I was allowed
to make copies of approximately 2000 private documents, including 51 documents on
khul‘. The analysis in this article will be based on these 51 documents, which were orig-
inally issued by religious actors in Berlin and are currently stored at the University of
Erlangen-Nuremberg, encompassing private detailed information on the procedure of
khul‘ and its stipulations. The documents also contain the numerous solutions that reli-
gious actors have proposed following a wife’s request for a khul‘ subsequent to a break-
down of her marriage. Furthermore, the texts shed light on the role of imams in the
process of khul‘, the amount of fidya that a wife is expected to pay to her divorcee, and
issues pertaining to child custody. It is also important to note that all of these documents
are pertaining to cases of Islamic religious-only marriages.18
The Nika¯h. Dilemma
According to the interviews conducted for this study, an increasing number of Muslims
in Germany, particularly in Arab communities and among refugees, are currently decid-
ing to opt for religious-only marriages, without registering them according to state laws
and regulations. There are different reasons and motivations of why some couples
choose a religious-only marriage such as religious preference, cultural bias and lack of
information about civil marriage.19 In addition, insufficient documentation is a crucial
factor. There is a legal requirement to procure a marriage eligibility certificate (Ehefähig-
keitszeugnis), from the state of origin, which testifies that the couple is not yet married.
This document, however, is often difficult to provide. It was also noticed, during my
4 Mahmoud Jaraba
participant observation, that the legal requirements and procedures of the local registry
office (Standesamt) differ from one place to another, which sometimes makes it imposs-
ible for a couple to register their marriage.
In summer 2016, I volunteered to help Syrian refugees with translation to register their
marriages at the concerned registry offices (Standesamt) in the cities of Nuremberg and
Fürth in northern Bavaria. I found that, while the proceedings in Nuremberg were
rather straightforward and required minimal bureaucratic procedures, it was quite the
opposite in Fürth. For instance, officials asked the couple to include a marriage eligibility
certificate in their application, which would have to be certified by the German Embassy
in Beirut, since the German Embassy in Damascus has been closed since 2012. Since
they were unable to secure the needed document from Lebanon, this made it impossible
for the couple to register their marriage in Germany, and they thus later decided to resort
to a religious-only marriage. The other couple in Nuremberg had a totally different
experience, even though they had the same refugee status as did the first couple, i.e.
full protection status for three years and travel documents as foreigners in Germany. I
observed that the registry office in Nuremberg attempted to make everything less bureau-
cratic, and did not demand a marriage eligibility certificate to register the marriage of the
couple. Within few weeks, they were able to register their marriage, and celebrate later on
with an Islamic marriage ceremony.
There are virtually no official statistics on the frequency of religious-only marriage in
Germany, and all the imams interviewed came up with relatively different estimates.
For instance, Mamdouh,20 a Palestinian imam in Berlin, appraised the percentage of reli-
gious-only marriage in the Arab communities in Berlin at approximately 70%, whereas
Anas, a Tunisian imam, estimated it to be roughly 50%. Imams from the Turkish com-
munity estimated the rate to be between 20% and 30%. Abdulkader, an Egyptian
imam affiliated with an Islamic centre in Southern Germany, believes that, in the light
of the growing number of Muslim refugees currently flowing into the country from con-
flict zones in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of religious-only marriages is likely
to increase. He, like many other imams interviewed, trusts that these people will find it
difficult to obtain the identity documents required for the civil marriage registration
process.21
In Germany, religious-only marriages are sometimes referred to as “Islamic marriage”,
“mosque marriage” or simply “nika¯h.”. Most of these forms include all or some of the
elements involved in Islamic nika¯h. , such as two witnesses, mahr (dower), and/or family
agreement and publicity of the nikah. However, all of these nika¯h. types of marriage
have no civil ceremony, and they do not fully comply with the prerequisites of a state-
run civil marriage. Religious-only marriages,22 which are not registered at the registry
offices and thus do not comply with the state law or the entailed formalities, are not recog-
nised by state authorities and might have significant ramifications. The German legal
system and courts only recognise civil marriages that have taken place in the presence
of a civil servant in line with standard legal procedures. Unlike some European countries,
such as England and Spain, which recognise religious marriages if performed in the pres-
ence of an authorised civil servant and registered with civil authorities, the Standesamt
(registry office) is the sole central state authority responsible for the registration of mar-
riages in Germany. As opposed to other European countries, such as the Netherlands,23
which criminalise all that is involved in such marriage ceremonies, Germany does not
criminalise such a form of marriage. However, religious-only marriages, which occur
in mosques or private places such as homes, private offices or sometimes coffee shops
and are performed by a religious figure or common individuals (laypeople), are not
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recognised by the state. Therefore, the parties involved have no legal standing or lawful
claim to various legal rights of a spouse, such as inheritance, tax benefits, or social support.
Although German courts do not recognise Islamic religious-only marriage as legal mar-
riage, such forms of marriage are considered to be legitimate on religious, moral, and
social levels, and women involved in such marriages are unable to remarry within their
religious community unless they get a religiously-recognised divorce (t.ala¯q). Should a
marriage break down and a husband decline a request for divorce, a wife may find
herself in an unresolved situation and without any legal protection. Since such a
woman’s marriage was never registered in a civil registry,24 such a religious-only marriage
is considered as non-marriage in the eyes of German courts and is “simply ignored by
German law”.25 To make it worse, such women might also not find any help by socially
recognised religious authorities, because such identities have not been institutionalised in
Germany.26 Based on the fieldwork conducted, it can be said that Germany is lacking all
forms of civil Islamic arbitration or mediation that can exercise jurisdiction over marriage
or divorce and make religious rulings.27 Consequently, many women are unable to ter-
minate their marriage and must continue living in an unsettled situation, unless their hus-
bands are willing to divorce them. In ArabMuslim communities in Germany, a woman in
such a situation is referred to as “suspended” (mu‘allaqa, plural mu‘allaqa¯t).28
The following case highlights the form of organised blackmailing that a woman seeking
divorce through khul‘ might encounter. In the summer of 2015, I met a 23-year-old
German-born woman, Ahlam, in Berlin, along with her Palestinian parents. For more
than three years, Ahlam, who chose a nika¯h. with a second-generation Palestinian, has,
so far, unsuccessfully been trying to leave her husband. Her mother gave the subsequent
account of her situation:
My daughter has been in a state of limbo (mu‘allaqa) for the past three-and-a-
half years and no one can do anything. She is being approached with marriage
proposals (khut.ba), but she cannot get married since [her husband] has yet to
divorce her. His family members are blackmailing us and want us to pay every-
thing in return for her divorce. They are exploiting the fact that we have no one
to help here, but I tell them that God is there for us. [The Muslim community
and the German state] should find a solution. People are blackmailing each
other and women are being kept in uncertainty because husbands want to be
refunded for all the money they have spent on them. Is that acceptable in our
religion?!29
In such a situation, both Ahlam and her family will most likely resort to local religious
actors in the hope that they might be able to help the couple reach a mutual agreement
over how best to dissolve their nika¯h. .
Muslim Mediation and Arbitration in Germany
In order to protect women seeking to end an unwanted marriage, Muslim communities
practice different types of religious mediation and arbitration. It is also important to note
that Muslim communities in Germany are diverse groups both culturally and ethnically
and are significantly different in the way they approach and deal with internal family con-
flicts. Although Muslims as individuals and small groups have actually had a presence in
Germany for hundreds of years, their current presence is, first and foremost, a result of
the labour migration of the 1960s and early 1970s.30 In subsequent decades, asylum
became another reason for immigration. Asylum seekers came mostly from Lebanon,
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Turkey, Iran, former Yugoslavia and most recently from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran,
and Africa.
Based on demographic and statistical information, it is believed that Germany today is
home to around 4.4–4.7 million Muslims (accounting for 5.4–5.7% of the 82.2 million
inhabitants of Germany) who are ethnically, religiously, and culturally very diverse
(Tables 1 and 2).
As opposed to the English socio-legal context, which allowed Muslims to develop
bodies to resolve their internal conflicts using a different form of mediation and arbitra-
tion, there are some areas where the German legal system does not take private dispute-
settlement arrangements into account. Many areas of family law, such as issues associated
with marriage and divorce, are an “absolute state monopoly”, and all private dispute
settlements are disregarded. In effect, “the Federal Court has explicitly stated that the
German legal order does not recognise an autonomous regulation of family law, law of
persons and law of inheritance by religious communities”.31 However, this excludes
private regulations on matrimonial property or other financial aspects of divorce, which
may be a matter for arbitration.32
With regard to Islamic religious-only marriages, which are ignored by court and are
considered as a “non-marriage”, there is nothing in the German law that prohibits the
usage of different mechanisms of mediation as long as these mechanisms do not contra-
dict the prevailing laws. The law of Germany both protects and regulates mediation as it is
a flexible, cost-effective and practical alternative to court proceedings. The Federal Law
of Mediation (Mediationsgesetz) and the Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung) all
facilitate traditional forms of dispute resolution and mediation taking place outside









Note: Anja Stichs, “Wie viele Muslime leben in Deutschland? Eine Hochrechnung
über die Anzahl der Muslime in Deutschland zum Stand 31. Dezember 2015”, Im
Auftrag der Deutschen Islam Konferenz (Working Paper 71), 2016, p.31.








Note: Sonja Haug, Stephanie Müssig and Anja Stichs, Muslim Life in
Germany: A Study Conduced on Behalf of the German Conference on Islam,
Research Report 6, Nuremberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees,
2009, p. 92.
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courts. While the system does not explicitly offer religious judgments, it at least accepts
dispute resolution structures, both in the form of mere mediation between the parties and
in the form of an arbitration by an appointed court-like institution, as long as the solutions
and the proceedings applied do not interfere with certain indispensable requirements
established by state law.33 In other words, the German courts will go along with a settle-
ment reached through a private arbitrator or mediator, unless it fails to comply with “the
general norms and values of state law, namely the fundamental rights of the citizens”.34
To elaborate, people can usually rely on the state to enforce settlements which have been
reached by such means.
As Rohe has recently explained, the ADR “under the auspices of any cultural or reli-
gious norms is acceptable or even desirable so long as it meets the following prerequisites:
. The parties must freely agree on the ADR mechanism, and opting out at any time
has to be granted;
. Undue pressure or the exercise of violence against the parties, witnesses or other
persons involved must be avoided;
. The ADR process must be performed neutrally and professionally;
. The limits of mandatory law of the country must be respected”.35
Based on the fieldwork conducted, it can be stated that the various extrajudicial reli-
gious forms of mediation and arbitration among Arab Sunni communities in Germany
do not meet some or all of the previous prerequisites. Mediation and arbitration are
still unofficial and informal practices, with insufficiently distinct or transparent guidelines
or institutional structures in place to regulate them through a set of decided, approved,
and standardised procedures. In addition, they are not subject to any form of state or judi-
cial recognition or regulation, and all of the religious actors interviewed in this study
neither have the accredited mediation certification nor the licences needed to engage
in the profession and deal with social and family conflicts as required by law.36
Furthermore, in practice, individual rights, especially women’s rights, are in some
cases relinquished under strong religious and social pressure to reach a win–win agree-
ment. During the fieldwork conducted, I came across several cases of women being press-
ured into waiving their financial rights (e.g. their mahr) to get an Islamic divorce or khul‘.
Therefore, it can be said that there is sometimes a difference between theory (according
to the religious mediators) and reality. From the perspective of religious actors, the
process of mediation leads to a win–win situation that is fair and satisfies all parties
involved. However, in reality, not all parties are necessarily satisfied or convinced that
they have received their full rights.
Religious actors who engage in settling private, religious, economic, or social con-
flicts through mediation or arbitration, and can therefore be defined as applying
sharı¯ʿah, handle family disputes and issue nika¯h. and t.ala¯q or khul‘ certificates. There
are two chief types of religious actors which should be distinguished clearly—(1)
imams, who remain the most important religious actors, and (2) self-appointed inde-
pendent mediators and arbitrators who, in most cases, operate independently of
mosques or prayer rooms. Both these groups of actors attempt to legitimise decisions
by basing them on religious scriptures (Qur’an and Sunnah). On a different note, there
are around 2350 mosques and prayer rooms (including Alevi cem houses) to satisfy the
religious and social needs of the Muslim communities, which employ approximately
2179 imams (or dede for Alevis) to fulfil a range of different functions.37 Many of
those imams extend their role beyond the limited confines of worship to cater for all
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aspects of Muslim life, including attempts to resolve family disputes, through playing
the role of a “mediator” (wası¯t.) or “arbitrator” (muh.akkam).
38 Consequently, the role
of many imams has shifted from being limited solely to leading prayers or teaching
children the Qur’an, to offering help in matters of family disputes, marital discord,
or even performing the role of a Muslim judge (qa¯d. ı¯) in order to grant women a khul‘.
The Analysis of Khul‘ Documents: An Overview
In Islam, the right to t.ala¯q is exclusively the prerogative of the man.
39 Divorce occurs
when a mentally fit man utters the word/ phrase of divorce in front of his wife or, accord-
ing to sharı¯ʿah, in her absence before a Muslim judge. In such cases, the husband is
obliged to pay his wife alimony and honour her mahr.40 On the other hand, when a
husband is unwilling to divorce his wife, she is usually faced up with three equally unpa-
latable options. First, continue to live with the husband and endure the associated
psychological or physical harm involved; second, move out and live alone, giving up
on obtaining a divorce or remarrying, thus putting herself in a state of uncertainty bur-
dened by the intrinsic pressure of religious convictions or external social pressure.
Finally, she can seek khul‘ and most probably pay the husband a fidya, which might be
the mahr, or part of it (or, in some cases, a very large sum of money) in return for his
agreement to terminate the marriage.
The historical sources and religious legitimacy for khul‘ are mentioned in both the
Qur’an and the Sunnah. The legality of khul‘ can be found in Verse 2:229:
Divorce is (revocable) two times (after pronouncement), after which (there are
two ways open for husbands), either (to) keep (the wives) honourably, or part
with them in a decent way. You are not allowed to take away the least of what
you have given your wives, unless both of you fear that you would not be able
to keep within the limits set by God. If you fear you cannot maintain the
bounds fixed by God, there will be no blame on either if the woman redeems
herself. Do not exceed the limits of God, for those who exceed the bounds
set by God are transgressors.41
Verse 2:229 does not specify the amount and type of fidya a woman should return to her
husband in exchange for her release. However, a well-established hadı¯th clearly specifies
that a woman should return themahr that her husband has given her.42 The hadı¯th version
can be found below:
The wife of Thabit b. Qays b. Shammas [Habiba] came to theMessenger, peace
be upon him, and said: ‘O Messenger of God, I do not hate Thabit neither
because of his faith nor his nature, except that I fear unbelief.’ The Messenger
of God, peace be upon him, said: ‘Will you give back his orchard?’ She said
‘Yes’ and she gave it back to him and he [the Prophet] ordered him and so he
[Thabit] separated from her.43
However, the Islamic schools of law have different views and interpretations of how khul‘
can be best practiced and enforced.44 As will be discussed below, Muslim scholars are
divided over whether or not the judge has the right to terminate a marriage contract
should a husband refuse to accept his wife’s request for a khul‘. They also disagree
about the permissible amount and type of fidya.45 In Muslim countries, this is also prac-
ticed differently from one place to another.46
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In Germany, according to the fieldwork conducted for this research, religious actors
were starting to discuss and practise cases of no-fault divorce by means of a khul‘ pro-
cedure as far back as the mid-1990s, and the documents collected during the fieldwork
confirm this finding. The chronological order of the documents along with the number
of cases is as follows: three cases in 1998, two cases in 2000, 2004, 2006, 2007 and
2008 respectively, three cases in 2009, nine cases in 2010, twelve cases in 2011, three
cases in 2012 and finally one case in 2015.47 The nationalities of the husbands were Leba-
nese, Jordanian, Syrian, Iraqi, Palestinian, Yemeni, and Kuwaiti, respectively. The wives,
for their part, came fromGermany, the Czech Republic, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and
Palestine.
All of the 51 documents include statements and terms that directly pertain to khul‘.
They were set out in the following way, except where it was necessary to include other
conditions relating to child custody or financial disputes.
Khul‘ and ibra¯’ Document
Praise be to Allah and May Peace be Upon His Messenger
The Islamic Institution of {… } testifies that the husband: Bilal Al-Tamimi,
Place of Birth: Berlin, has divorced his wife: Fatima Abd, Place of Birth:
Berlin. Based on her desire to be divorced from the husband, the wife is con-
sidered to be divorced from the husband in an irrevocable manner with
minor separation. Rights of the Husband: he has the right to get back the full
amount of the mahr, which is a total of four thousand euros and a complete
set of gold jewellery. Rights of the wife: she has waived all of her legitimate
rights and is not entitled to any financial rights.
Based on the Wife’s Request
The wife uttered the following words in the presence of the husband: “I absolve
you from your responsibilities under the bond of matrimony,” and the husband
replied: “I accept that and I divorce you.”
As of 22/03/2013, she must observe a one-month waiting period [before remar-
rying].
Although all the documents contain various terms used to indicate khul‘, only 38 of the 51
documents bore titles that clearly referred to the khul‘ process, while the remainder had
no titles at all other than the generic bismilla¯hi r-rah.ma¯ni r-rah. ı¯m, i.e. “in the name of God,
the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful”, which almost inevitably appears in all Islamic
documents.
The titles of the documents were as follows:
• Khul‘ and ibra¯’ (renunciation divorce) Certificate (15 documents)
• Nika¯h. Contract Termination through Khul‘ (11 documents)
• T. ala¯q Certificate (9 documents)
• Khul‘ Certificate Prior to Marriage Consummation (2 documents)
• T. ala¯q Certificate Due to Harm (d.arar)
Most of the imams I met during my fieldwork agreed that a marriage becomes void once
both the wife and husband agree to a khul‘- based divorce, regardless of the title of the
divorce documents or the specific details of the actual process. The khul‘ would be
valid as long it clearly indicates an exchange of money or mahr offered by the wife and
accepted by the husband. Faysal Mawlawi, a former Muslim judge and deputy head of
the European Council for Fatwa and Research, states that a khul‘ is valid as long as
both the husband and wife agree to end their relationship and the wife pays fidya.
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Mawlawi adds that some scholars mention a number of relevant terms, such as khul‘,
fidya, s.ulh. (reconciliation), muba¯raʾa (a two-sided divorce that is similar or equal to
khul‘), t.ala¯q and mufa¯raqa.
48 According to Mawlawi, several scholars believe that the
explicit use of some of these terms during the process of khul‘ is mandatory, but the
majority assume that any term that conveys the meaning of khul‘ is appropriate and accep-
table.49
The documents depict khul‘ as an initial, irrevocable divorce with minor separation
(t.ala¯q ba¯ʾin baynuna¯ sughra¯). In other words, if a husband wanted his wife back, he
would need to acquire a new nika¯h contract and pay another mahr once more.
However, if a husband divorced his wife three times, this should be an irrevocable
divorce with major separation (t.ala¯q ba¯ʾin baynuna¯ kubra¯) and he would have no right
to return to his wife unless she married another man who subsequently divorced her or
died. The waiting period (ʿidda) before a woman can remarry is one month.
In order to better understand and analyse these documents, they can be divided into
two groups: khul‘ by mutual consent and judicial khul‘.
Khul‘ by Mutual Consent
The majority of Muslim scholars and the four Sunni schools of Islamic law agree that a
khul‘ requires mutual agreement of husband and wife. According to Nadia Sonneveld,
“the four Sunni schools of Islamic law know only a consensual form of khul‘ divorce”,
which indicates that “a woman can take the initiative to request a divorce from her
husband, but she still cannot obtain it without his permission”.50 The mutual agreement
of the husband and wife can happen through eithermuba¯ra’a or khul‘. In muba¯ra’a, repu-
diation is by mutual consent, and each spouse waives financial obligations,51 whereas in
khul‘, the husband repudiates his wife at her demand, and in return for fidya that may be
some or all of her financial divorce rights. Such fidya can be a portion (or all) of the mahr
she has received at the beginning of the marriage, or any other agreement she might have
reached with her husband. Faysal Mawlawi stated that the process of khul‘ could take
effect once both parties have willingly agreed to the divorce, without acting under coer-
cion by either the authorities or the judges.52
The majority of imams interviewed interpreted khul‘ as a mutual agreement of husband
and wife. Among 59 religious actors who engage in khul‘-related matters, 49 practise
khul‘ only by mutual consent and refuse to grant a woman a khul‘-based divorce
without her husband’s consent. The remaining 10 are more flexible towards playing
the role of a Muslim judge (qa¯d. ı¯), thus granting a woman a khul‘-based divorce even
without her husband’s consent, which is also reflected in the documents (see below).53
In fact, most of the documented records of khul‘ cases (82%, or 42 documents)
showed that there had been mutual agreement of husband and wife; only 18% of the
cases, i.e. nine documents, were settled through judicial measures.
How the documents deal with two important aspects of khul‘, the fidya and child
custody, will be analysed in the following two sections.
The Fidya
The fidya is one of the most problematic aspects of the practice of khul‘ in Germany. It is
true that the practice of khul‘ can be to the advantage of Muslim women, as it the case in
Muslim majority contexts. However, German laws place women on equal footing with
men, as they are entitled to initiate a divorce if they no longer wish to keep their marriage.
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From a Western philosophical perspective, obliging women to pay fidya in return for a
divorce is discriminatory and undermines any notion of equality between men and
women. In addition, as will be discussed below, the issue of fidya unduly restricts
women’s possibility of being divorced, particularly those struggling financially who
cannot pay. There is further restriction on their remarrying, especially for those who
cannot pay fidya which might be some or all of their mahr—or, in some cases, even
more than the mahr, as found during the fieldwork.
The agreements and conditions of khul‘ were consistent with what religious actors
stated during the fieldwork, namely, that the wife ought to pay fidya and the husband
must approve the khul‘. Although there is no clear minimum or maximum in terms of
fidya, the religious actors agreed that it is acceptable and customary that the fidya
should not exceed the advance mahr or any costs incurred by the husband, especially if
the marriage has not yet been consummated. Gifts, however, are not part of the
amount that a wife must return to her husband. However, as a condition to agreeing
for khul‘, some husbands may request a considerable sum of money. Many religious
actors in Berlin have told me, in detail, about a case where a husband asked his wife to
return as much as €50,000 in exchange for agreeing to a khul‘, although the wife’s
mahr was not more than €5000. Although the religious actors explained that such
demands are non-Islamic and thus forbidden in Islam, they cannot, in such a case,
pressure the husband to divorce his wife, as they do not have the power or authority to
do this. Thus, women are sometimes forced into unfair alternatives, i.e. having to com-
pensate their husbands financially or endure domestic violence or other forms of abuse.
Some women will succumb to social, cultural or religious pressure to accept their hus-
band’s unjust terms if that is their only way out of a turbulent and abusive marriage. Hus-
bands, on the other hand, sometimes subject their wives and families to punishing
pressure and harsh treatment to avoid the potential financial commitments that would
result from exercising their right to t.ala¯q.
Muba¯ra’a and Mahr
The documents examined in this study show that only six cases can be considered as
muba¯ra‘a, where the husbands waived the advance dower (mahr muʿajjal/muqaddam)
paid to the wives. The wives, in return, waived the remaining portion of the dower
(mahr muʾajjal/muʾakhkhar). The remaining 36 documents can be considered as khul‘
as the wives sent back their advance mahrs or gold jewellery to their husbands in
return for a khul‘. In some khul‘ cases, the amounts of money a wife had to return to
secure a khul‘ were stated in detail. For instance, in one document, Manal’s husband
demanded she send back a gold ring, a wedding ring, and €5755 in return for his
consent to divorce. For more details, the foregoing amount was broken down as
follows: mahr: €5000; gold: €200; accessories: €40; sandals: €40; clothing: €103; and
other additional expenses: €450. In addition, Manal reimbursed the costs of the nika¯h
ceremony.
However, it is important to mention that a mahr is sometimes symbolic and is not
specifically declared in the nika¯h certificate, which often worsens the dispute between
the spouses and their families. Some of the nika¯h certificates collected during the field-
work have only one euro or a copy of the Qur’an set as the mahr agreed upon. In this
case, many might think that writing a symbolic prompt mahr in nika¯h certificate might
make it easier for women to repay this small amount and get a khul‘. However, the oppo-
site might happen. In many cases, as many imams have explained, couples or their
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families agree that the mahr should be written symbolically in a marriage contract, but a
husband would pay a full mahr, which can be a few thousand Euros. In this case, the con-
flict over the mahr becomes complicated and difficult to solve because the imam acts on
what is actually written in a marriage contract, and if the husband objects and asks the
wife to return the full amount he has paid and, in some cases, the engagement presents,
the imam must defer to him. Without the husband’s consent, the imam cannot issue a
khul‘ certificate for the wife.
Practically speaking, not all women have the same financial capacity to relinquish their
mahr or pay additional sums of money to buy their “freedom”. If a wife is unable to pay
the entire amount but still insists on separating, the money can be paid in instalments and
the khul‘ would remain pending until full amount has been paid. This is what happened
with Dalal, who was required to return €3000 worth of gold, in addition to extra €2000.
The total amount, i.e. €5000 was then required to be paid on a monthly basis of €200.
However, due to the fact that she was struggling financially, Dalal was unable to pay
the whole amount even after three years. She then wanted to remarry, and that was an
incident that the imam who had performed the khul‘ had never experienced before. In
this case, fatwa¯s issued abroad played a crucial role in redefining khul‘ practices in
Germany. The imam contacted scholars associated with Islamtoday.com, an online
fatwa¯ portal based in Saudi Arabia.54 He recounted Dalal’s story and enquired
whether she had the right to marry again before she had completely paid off the
amount needed, knowing that she was still paying instalments.
The imam received the following answer:
A wife may seek khul‘ if her husband is oppressing her. She may also ransom
herself if the husband requests that as mentioned in the Qur’an (2:229).
Hence, the wife would be officially divorced starting from the first instalment
she had made. The remaining amount would be considered as an outstanding
debt to be repaid by her. She must also observe the waiting period (ʿidda) which
relates to women divorced through khul‘ before remarrying, which is one men-
strual cycle, to ensure she is not pregnant. Hence, she may remarry.
Based on the fatwa¯ given, the imam issued Dalal a t.ala¯q certificate. However, Dalal was
not the only wife who was unable to pay the fidya. A similar case shows that paying fidya
for the husband might be highly costly for women struggling financially, even when the
mahr amount is minimal: the wife was a woman of German origin who had converted
to Islam and married another new convert. The woman then wanted to obtain a khul‘,
but was unable to pay the required mahr, which was €500. This case was also a new chal-
lenge for the imam. It posed the question as to whether it was permissible to collect
donations from the mosque where he worked to cover the monetary sum that the wife
was required to pay? After extensive consultations with a group of scholars, the imam con-
cluded that, according to sharı¯ʿah, it is acceptable to collect donations for the purpose of
setting a woman free from a life she does not want. And thus, the sum was collected and
the wife was able to secure her khul‘.
In four cases, the husbands opposed their wives’ demand for khul‘, which is relatively
unusual because, under sharı¯ʿah law, men can always divorce their spouses through t.ala¯q.
The only likely reason for a husband to choose khul‘ over t.ala¯qwould be to evade the finan-
cial responsibilities associated with a t.ala¯q-based divorce, as in a khul‘ divorce, a wife
usually relinquishes her rights to material support embodied in the mahr and nafaqa in
exchange for her “freedom”.55 Such a form of khul‘ can also be considered as muba¯ra’a.
If a husband agrees to offer khul‘, the divorce takes the following form:
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Khul‘ and Ibra’ Divorce
The Islamic Institution of (name) testifies that the husband: Sa‘eed Alan, Place
of Birth: Syria, has divorced his wife: Juliana Alexa, Place of Birth: Czech
Republic. The two sides have agreed to khul‘ and ibra’. The husband said to
the wife: “I absolve you from the bond of matrimony in return for absolving
me from your Sharı¯ʿah rights,” and the wife replied: “I accept and absolve
you from my Sharı¯ʿah rights”.
Child Custody (H. ad. a¯na)
Even though Muslim scholars disagree on different conditions of khul‘, there are some
conditions that are considered impermissible under sharı¯ʿah.56 These include forcing a
wife to forsake custody of her children in exchange for a khul‘. Some husbands exert lever-
age over their spouse by using child custody during the khul‘ negotiations and pressure the
wives to willingly give up child custody in return for a divorce. Under sharı¯ʿah law, a wife
divorced by her husband has temporary rights of custody until the child has reached a
certain age. The exact age varies across the madhhabs (legal schools).57
All religious actors try to avoid any involvement in child custody cases and advise
spouses to settle the matter under German law, since it is virtually impossible to
implement any other arrangement. This is because, while the German judiciary cannot
assist women who only have a nika¯h. and seek a religious divorce, the state courts do
not link child custody to the marital status of the parents. Therefore, a wife can always
address state courts and file for the custody of her child, regardless of the nature of her
marriage being religious or civil. In such a case, the court will decide the matter based
on the best interest of the child.
However, some religious actors try to reach an agreement between husband and wife in
a manner that does not contradict the German law. According to Imam Ayoub, if both
parties want to avoid having to appear in a German court, they have no choice other
than to reach a joint decision on the issue of custody. Among other things, the couple
also has to agree on visitation schedules/arrangements as well as the education of the chil-
dren. In such cases, no party is forced to accept any decision that is not in their interest
since they can always resort to the German courts. Therefore, some imams make it a rule
of thumb that any decision reached must comply with the German law. However, achiev-
ing this is rather difficult, especially since most imams are not even vaguely familiar with
the German legal system.
Only seven of the 51 documents covered custody-related matters in detail. Of these,
either the custody of the children was given to the mother, or a joint custody arrangement
was reached. Had these cases been brought to German courts, the same results would
have been reached because, under the German law, custody must be shared. This also
applies to children born outside marriage.
In the first case in question, the husband relinquished child custody to his wife, but was
allowed to visit the children. In the second case, a shared custody agreement entailed the
child spends four and a half days with the mother and two and a half days with the father.
Further arrangements concerning the child’s future were also agreed upon. In the third
case, the children would stay with their father from Friday noon until Sunday afternoon
and spend the remainder of the week with their mother. The fourth case, arranged accord-
ing to sharı¯ʿah law, entailed the child staying with her mother until the age of nine, with
custody afterwards being decided according to the child’s best interest. In the fifth case,
shared custody was agreed upon without any mention of further details.
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In the sixth and seventh cases, the husbands asked their wives to relinquish custody in
exchange for the khul‘ and they agreed to this. Unfortunately, my attempts to locate
these two wives to obtain further details from them were unsuccessful. Instead, I
called Imam Mamdouh who had organised their khul‘ divorces. The imam affirmed
that these cases were the only ones in which the wives were asked to waive their right
to custody. Healsoaddedthat thesewereextremelycomplicatedcasesand the twohusbands
had categorically rejected a khul‘ by mutual consent. Consequently, the imam persuaded
these two wives to accept their terms and then afterwards, once having secured the khul‘,
take the matter to court to obtain custody. Mamdouh went on to explain that German
courts cannot force a husband to divorce his wife, but they almost invariably grant custody
to the mother, even if there was no marriage. Mamdouh stated that, according to sharı¯ʿah
law, all requirements other than the fidya are invalid—a matter that all scholars have
agreed upon. The scholars believe that if the husband insists on custody in exchange for
khul‘, the divorce would be deemed valid and the wife could then seek redress from the
German courts.
Judicial Khul‘
Muslim scholars are divided over whether or not the judge has the right to terminate a
marriage contract if a husband refuses to accept his wife’s request for a khul‘.58 They
disagree over whether a qa¯d. ı¯ can force a husband to accept the fidya and, therefore,
divorce his wife. According to Bustami Khir, “very few jurists have taken the view
that khul‘ can be decided [only] in a court, and the majority including Ma¯lik,
al-Sha¯fiʿı¯ and [Ibn] H. anbal allow it, with or without the intervention of a judge”.
59
Despite this dispute, the laws pertaining to personal status in several Muslim countries,
including Pakistan,60 Egypt,61 and Jordan,62 have been reformed and women are now
able to submit a complaint to the judge.63 Since then, a judge has the right to terminate
a marriage contract through khul‘, even if the wife and/or husband, refuses to accept the
decision.
Although the legal framework in the Islamic world allows Muslim judges to perform
khul‘ in the context of their own national legal system, religious actors in Germany are
not recognised as judges. Hence, the majority of the ones I met in Germany categorically
refused to play any part in the process of khul‘. Hani, a Berlin-based Egyptian imam,
believes that any Muslim woman who finds herself in an unfitting position regarding
her marriage has the right to seek separation from her husband with the help of khul‘.
Should a husband refuse to cooperate, the imam believes that the wife has the right
then to resort to a Muslim judge. However, Hani, who has now been conducting khul‘
divorces for six years, explains that it is impossible for a Muslim woman to get a
divorce if her husband is averse to the idea, and he attributes this dilemma to the lack
of a formal Islamic judicial authority in Germany. He also added that he and his col-
leagues do not perform khul‘ without a husband’s consent, which could theoretically
place women in a state of uncertainty for an undecided period.
However, very few imams tried to reinterpret the religious texts and to evoke certain
fatwa¯s in order to adapt the role that judges play in Muslim countries to the European
context. Basically, these fatwa¯s state that in the absence of a Muslim judge, as in
Europe, the Muslim community may assign the powers of a Muslim judge to the local
imam or a group of people.64 Ahmed, an Egyptian imam, states that if an imam, or com-
mittee tasked with overseeing marriage issues, makes a decision, then such a decision
must be adhered to and implemented.
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The Judicial Khul‘ Process
Based on several interviews with religious actors, as well as the documents analysed, it can
safely be concluded that, as a general rule, a judicial khul‘ process consists of several steps.
First, a wife or a representative of hers makes an oral or written request for a separation
from her husband through khul‘. In most cases, a wife is asked to attach her nika¯h certi-
ficate with the request, along with any other documents or witnesses she might have to
support her case. Even though there is no religious requirement for a wife to justify her
request for a khul‘, women, seeking divorce, tend to present documentary evidence of
their husband’s prolonged absence or mistreatment of them. For instance, one document
reveals that a wife named Fatima sought divorce because her husband was addicted to
gambling, hit her, missed his prayers, took his children’s money, and hardly ever spoke
to her. In some cases, wives present documents to support their position during the nego-
tiation process, such as police reports or a hospital certificate proving that their spouses
had physically assaulted them.
In the second step, which is optional, a wife might ask an imam to represent her by fol-
lowing up on her case and keeping in touch with her husband. The third step starts when,
after submitting the request for a khul‘, an imam attempts to contact the husband with the
intention of bringing about a reconciliation between him and his wife by playing a med-
iatory role. If the mediation process fails and both the husband and wife remain intran-
sigent, the imam, in the fourth stage, will then attempt to persuade the husband to
divorce his wife with kindness and grace in return for a fidya he will receive for the loss
of his wife. These attempts are repeated at least three more times over a period of
three to six months. If the husband still refuses to reach an agreement with his wife
and wants to subject her to a state of uncertainty, the fifth step would be for the imam
to notify (or even threaten) him claiming that the khul‘ process will not be interrupted
even without his consent. If there is still absolutely no way to achieve reconciliation or
a mutual khul‘ agreement, the sixth and final step may be for the imam to perform a “judi-
cial khul‘” and later inform the husband that his wife has divorced him and, at that point,
get him to sign the divorce certificate.
The Practice of Judicial Khul‘
The following case demonstrates how judicial khul‘ is practised and under what con-
ditions. Asma chose a nika¯h. in 2007, but the marriage was not a success, as her
husband brutally and systematically beat her and on one occasion even broke her nose,
which necessitated her admission to the hospital for treatment. However, because
Asma and her husband had failed to record the nika¯h. at the registry office as a civil mar-
riage, she had no alternative but to seek help from ImamAyoub if she was to obtain a t.ala¯q
from her husband on the grounds of mistreatment.
During the fieldwork conducted in Berlin in 2015, I saw her request supported by
medical evidence, police statements and court reports, which included the following
excerpt:
My name is Asma Naser. I was born in Berlin in 1978 and I would like to be
divorced from Ahmed Salem, who was born in Beirut in 1974. He has been
beating me and my son (around three years old) for a while now. I submitted
a complaint twice to the court65 and he was ordered by the court to stay away
from me. Ultimately, all I want is to live my life with my son peacefully.
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In response to Asma’s request for a t.ala¯q from her husband, three imams—Ayoub from
Palestine, Samir from Tunisia, and Tawfiq from Algeria—met in Berlin on 5 May
2011 and together decided to help Asma. After lengthy proceedings, a committee com-
posed of the previously mentioned three imams issued the following decision:
In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful
Khul‘ and Ibra¯’ (Renunciation Divorce) Due to Harm (d.arar)
We […] and a group of Sheikhs testify that sister Asma Naser approached us
and complained about her husband’s (Ahmed Salim) mistreatment of her.
She informed us that he had beaten her and threatened to kill her and kidnap
her son[.] As a result, she filed a lawsuit against him at a German court and
won the case. Subsequently, the judge ordered him to refrain from calling
her, talking to her or going to her house. She also showed us court documents
and medical reports demonstrating the damages that she had incurred, as well
as the court decision […]. In order to verify her claims, we immediately con-
tacted her husband and asked him to come and discuss the matter with us.
Even though he promised to come to us on several occasions, he failed to
keep his promise each time[.] In view of the damages incurred by Asma, in
light of her statements, and in line with the Islamic principles of non-compul-
sion and fair divorce when a harmonious marriage becomes impossible, we
decided to grant sister Asma her freedom and right to seek a khul‘ divorce
according to Islamic sharı¯ʿah […] Therefore, we have decided that the wife is
divorced from the husband in a final, irrevocable divorce. As of today, she
must observe the waiting period.66
Only 18% of the khul‘ documents (9 out of 51) were carried out as a judicial khul‘. Unlike
the documents associated with a khul‘ by mutual consent, because the decision was made
without the husband’s agreement, these documents provide no details on either themahr or
custody. Nonetheless, these documents do contain important information on why some
women were forced to take this route. In contrast to the assertions of certain conservative
imams and community leaders who think that giving women the right to obtain a khul‘
will jeopardise family cohesion, some documents reveal the desperate and futile attempts
of wives to protect their families and restore their marriage. All but one document reveal
that the women only sought judicial khul‘ after having been subjected to violence or
harsh mistreatment. For instance, four cases indicated that the main reasons for seeking
a khul‘ were domestic violence, drug abuse and/or drug dealing, or imprisonment of the
husband. The remaining five cases documented the husband’s attempt to manipulate his
spouse into waiving child custody or paying money. For instance, Wafa’s husband insisted
that she waive all her rights, in the presence of a lawyer, in exchange for khul‘. Even after
accepting these conditions, the husband changed his mind and refused to divorce her.
Since this was quite an unprecedented case, the imam in question contacted scholars associ-
ated with the Islam Todaywebsite and obtained a fatwa¯ concluding that, “since the husband
has agreed to divorce the wife in exchange for waiving the mahr, this should be counted as
khul‘ and there is no way to reverse it”. Only then did the imam issue a khul‘ certificate.
Conclusion
This study has focused on the question of how religious actors settle Islamic religious-
only marriage disputes when a husband refuses to cooperate in a khul‘ process. An analy-
sis of 51 khul‘-related documents has provided a unique insight into the actual practices
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of khul‘ in Germany in the absence of a formal Islamic judicial body. This study divided
khul‘- related cases into two main categories. The first deals with cases in which there is
mutual consent. In other words, situations where both the husband and wife agree to seek
a khul‘. Essentially, it is strictly important, since there is no Islamic judicial authority in
Germany, that the overwhelming majority of khul‘ divorces are conducted on the basis
of mutual agreement of the husband and wife. In such cases, a wife is obliged to compen-
sate her husband monetarily for allowing her to terminate their marriage. If she refuses to
pay the fidya or agree with her husband’s terms, she could well remain in a state of uncer-
tainty for a prolonged period. Alternatively, a wife could be forced to continue living with
her husband and endure both the psychological or physical abuse that this decision might
entail. Where the khul‘ takes place through mutual consent, the issue of child custody is
also addressed and, as discussed, child custody-related decisions are deliberately taken to
comply with extant German law.
The second category of khul‘-related cases involves arbitration. Here, the religious actors
invoke particular religious fatwa¯s through which they can acquire for themselves some of
the powers normally reserved for judges in Muslim countries. These, in turn, enable
them to end a nika¯h. through khul‘, even if a husband withholds his consent. Although
this procedure grants some women their freedom, asMuslims consider it highly controver-
sial, few religious actors are prepared to arrange a khul‘ through arbitration. Their objection
stems from a fear of escalating social tensions within the Muslim community, especially in
cases where a husband refuses to divorce his wife. Besides, forcing a husband to divorce his
wife against his will is an exceedingly contentious topic among Muslim scholars. When a
husband refuses to divorce his wife, the lack of an Islamic judiciary in Germany and the
fact that imams are not qualified to play the role of judges make the issue even more
complex, even among proponents of arbitrated khul‘.
Consequently, a considerable number of imams call for measures and solutions to face
the challenge related to khul‘ practices in Germany in order to protect women from
abusive husbands. During the fieldwork conducted for this research, some imams explained
to me that they were discussing to introduce t.ala¯q al-tafwı¯d. (the delegated right to divorce
for a woman) to the marriage contract in order to empower women by replacing the hus-
band’s consent with a kind of “internally official” verdict. Other imams have started to think
of establishing an “advisory body” that would aim to settle family disputes and deal with
Islamic divorce-related issues, especially in situations where a husband refuses to divorce
his wife. Other Islamic organisations and mosques have started to organise training
courses to train a group of imams in mediation and arbitration techniques.
However, all of these measures are basically dealing with the consequences of the
problem rather than the cause. Muslim communities might need to address the root
cause of the need for khul‘ in the first place, namely, the existence of Islamic religious-
only marriage. This requires a set of solutions, including streamlining the marriage regis-
tration processes, and conducting awareness campaigns that explain the disadvantage of
unregistered marriages with regard to the protection of women’s rights and their social
security. Secondly, Muslim communities can use and benefit from different opportu-
nities and spaces, which the German legal system already recognises and provides for
all citizens in the areas of professional mediation and arbitration. Under German laws,
Muslims can institutionalise professional mediation by offering training for religious
mediators who can be equipped with professional skills needed to resolve disputes and
prevent violence, particularly domestic violence against women and children which is
often involved in marital dissolutions.
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